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INTRODUCTION: DEFINING THE FAR RIGHT
Peter Davies
Today, no political current is in ruder health than  the  far  right.  Across  the  continent  of
Europe, from Britain to the Baltics and Munich to  the  Mediterranean,  those  movements
and ideas we choose to classify as of far-right orientation are in pretty good  shape.  This
may not be a particularly healthy thing but, if we can put aside our partisan feelings  for  a
moment and look at the situation from the perspective of  a  political  scientist  or  modern
historian, it turns out that the rise and continued development of far-right  politics  is  both
beguiling and worthy of serious study.
     The world around us is constantly fascinating and it is  the  duty  of  academics  to  try
and make sense of it. Let us be frank: there is something unpleasant and worrying  about
the rise of the far right but in many countries  it  is  now  an  integral  part  of  political  life,
sometimes  in  government,  or  sharing   power,   or   racking   up   impressive   electoral
performances. And given its topicality there is an onus on us – yes,  an  onus  -  to  try  to
understand it, rationalise it and put it into context as dispassionately as possible.
So, the Encyclopedia of the Far Right in Europe is necessary. The aim of the volume  is
to explore the phenomenon and work towards classifying the people, movements, issues
and ideas, events, places and publications that constitute the far right in Europe. We  are
never going to be able to execute this  task  to  perfection  because,  as  a  contemporary
phenomenon, the far-right is constantly changing, and updating and  reinventing  itself.  It
is difficult to pin down and  make  judgements  about  something  that  is  so  current  and
modern. Depending on your taste in metaphors, it is like shooting at a  moving  target,  or
playing a game of football and realising that the goalposts, at both ends of the  pitch,  are
constantly moving.
There are also challenges implicit in compiling a reference work  of  this  nature.  What
balance do  you  strike  between  incarnations  of  the  far  right  in  different  parts  of  the
continent, in different eras, which have achieved different levels of success? To  illustrate
this point, we have had to balance the claims of parties that have no history  and  no  real
achievements  to  their  name   (like,   for   example,   the   confusingly-named   Ukrainian
Conservative Party, born 2005) with parties that have super-rich histories (like the MSI  in
Italy or Freedom Party in Austria). There is no easy way to deal with this kind of dilemma.
All we can say is that we have done our best and used our academic judgement, as  well
as our human instincts, to try  and  produce  a  book  that  is  as  balanced,  sensible  and
useful as possible.
We have also encountered the problem of definition.
Defining the far right
One anecdote serves to emphasise the difficulties inherent in defining ‘the far right’. As  I,
as editor, recruited fellow academics to write articles for this  encyclopedia,  nearly  every
one came back to me with the following line: ‘I’d be  delighted  to  help,  and  prepare  the
article you suggest, but can I ask you just one preliminary question: how exactly  are  you
defining the far  right  in  this  context?’  On  each  occasion  it  was  a  tricky  question  to
answer,  but  I  invariably  responded  with  something  like  this:   ‘Well,   I’m   writing   an
introductory section on “what is the far right?”, so I’ll send you  a  copy  of  that  when  it’s
ready.’ Now I come to writing this section, I realise once again what a  difficult  question  I
have left myself with to address.
     There are no easy answers to the question, ‘what is the far right?’. The far right  is  an
often confusing and bewildering part of the political  spectrum,  inhabited  by  a  range  of
strange and controversial political formations. One of the few  things  we  could  probably
agree upon from the outset is that ‘far right’ usually implies post-war, in the sense that far-
right political movements of the pre-1945 era are usually labeled simply  as  ‘fascist’.  But
still, ‘far right’ could imply late-1940s or early twenty-first century, so we  are  still  dealing
with a phenomenon that straddles seven decades.
     There are also terminological difficulties: ‘far right’, ‘extreme  right’,  ‘hard  right’,  ‘neo-
fascist’, ‘post-fascist’?  Are  these  terms  all  interchangeable  or  do  they  each  connote
something specific and different? This question will form  an  interesting  undercurrent  to
the ensuing discussion.
     Over the years,  commentators  have  exerted  much  time  and  energy  debating  the
character and ideological make-up of this thing we have come to refer to as the ‘far right’.
As a starting-point, let us consider the definition of the  international  far  right  offered  by
the controversial website, Wikipedia:
In the modern world, the  term  far  right  is  applied  to  those  who  support  authoritarianism,
usually  involving  a  dominant  class…and/or  an  established  church…Their   favored
authoritarian state can be an absolute monarchy, but more often today it is some form
of  oligarchy  or  military  dictatorship…The  term  ‘far  right’  also  embraces   extreme
nationalism, and will often evoke the ideal of a ‘pure’ ideal of the nation, often  defined
on racial or ‘blood’ grounds. They  may  advocate  the  expansion  or  restructuring  of
existing state borders to achieve this  ideal  nation,  often  to  the  point  of  embracing
expansionary war, racialism, jingoism and imperialism…More generally, the term  ‘far-
right’ has been applied to any stream of  political  thought  that  rejects  democracy  in
favour of some form of elite rule (including monarchy, plutocracy, and theocracy).[i]
Unintentionally perhaps, this ‘definition’ highlights the central  problem.  It  is  designed  to  offer
students and the general reader an accessible introduction to the topic; yet, if we are being harsh, it
offers  only  an  odd  mixture  of  the  obvious  and  some   other   confused   points   about
authoritarianism, religion and monarchy.
For Paul Wilkinson, the emergence of  this  modern  far  right  is  a  cause  for  both  regret  and
alarm. The first words in the preface to his book are as  follows:  ‘My  aim  in  writing  The  New
Fascists was to alert the general public,  and  particularly  the  young  generation,  to  the
resurgence of neo-fascist and related movements of the ultra-right,  and  the  implications
for the liberal democracies.’[ii] In  a  slightly  more  detached  manner,  Hans-Georg  Betz
portrays the far right is  an  amalgam  of  radicalism  and  xenophobic  populism.[iii]  Paul
Hainsworth defines it in a similar way. He talks about  the  ‘emergence  or  resurgence  of
extreme right-wing or neo-populist politics and parties that, to some extent, have  revived
fears of a return to the dark past, but which, in other ways, are very much the products of
more contemporary developments.’[iv]
This last point is significant, for the post-war far right is, by its  very  nature,  something
distinct  from  the  inter-war  fascist  right.  Of  course  there  are  echoes   of   Mussolini’s
Fascism and Hitler’s Nazism on the contemporary far right, but  on  the  whole  this  post-
war phenomenon is the product of new circumstances and influences. This is  something
Roger Griffin agrees on. He defines neo-fascism as ‘offering something new with  respect
to inter-war phenomena’ rather than ‘attempting to  resuscitate  an  earlier  movement’.[v]
Robert Paxton takes the argument a step further. He explains that far-right leaders, ‘have
become  adept  at  presenting  a  moderate  face  to  the  general  public  while   privately
welcoming outright fascist sympathisers with coded words about accepting one’s  history,
restoring national pride, or recognising the valor of combatants  on  all  sides.’[vi]  And  in
this context, Roger Eatwell cites the example of the MSI in Italy. He claims that the aim of
Gianfranco Fini, the leader of the movement, was to turn  the  MSI  ‘into  a  “post-fascist”,
moderate right-wing party, modeled loosely on the lines of French Gaullism.’[vii]
     Given the topicality and controversiality of the far right, news organisations  have  also  had  to
grapple with the same issue. In 2000 The Guardian in its special online report – ‘Europe’s far
right’  –  identified  the  following  individuals  and  movements  as  representative  of  the
phenomenon:
Austria
Freedom Party (FPÖ)
Key figures: Jörg Haider…Susanne Riess-Passer…
Belgium
Flemish Block (VB)
Key figure: Frank Vanhecke (VB’s president)
Denmark
Danish People’s Party (DPP)
Key figure: Pia Kjaersgaard (leader, DPP)
France
National Front (FN)
Key figure: Jean-Marie Le Pen (leader and founder, FN)
Germany
Republican Party (REP), German People’s Union (DVU), National Democratic Party (NPD)
Key figures: No dominant leaders.
Greece
Hellenic Front
Key figure: Makis Voridis (leader, Hellenic Front)
Italy
Northern League, National Alliance
Key figures: Umberto  Bossi  (leader,  Northern  League),  Gianfranco  Fini  (leader,  National
Alliance)
The Netherlands
Pim Fortuyn’s List (LPF), Liveable Netherlands
Key figure: Mat Herben (leader, LPF)
Norway
Progress party
Key figure: Carl Hagen (leader, Progress party)
Portugal
Popular party
Key figure: Paulo Portas (leader, Popular party)
Switzerland
Swiss People’s party (SVP)
Key figure: Christoph Blocher (Leader, SVP)
United Kingdom
British National party (BNP)
Key figure: Nick Griffin (leader, BNP)[viii]
In the same year, the BBC produced another online survey called ‘Rise of the Right’:
Norway
Political parties: Progress Party
Popular support: 15 percent
Key figures: Hagen
Sweden
Political parties: none
Popular support: none
Key figures: none
Denmark
Political parties: Danish People’s Party
Popular support: 18 percent
Key figures: Kjaesgaard
Netherlands
Political parties: Livable Netherlands, Pim Fortuyn List
Popular support: 16 percent
Key figures: Fortuyn (assassinated 6 May 2002)
Belgium
Political parties: Vlaams Blok
Popular support: 9.9 percent
Key figures: Dewinter
Spain
Popular support: n/a
France
Political parties: NF, MNR
Popular support: 17 percent
Key figures: Le Pen
Italy
Political parties: Northern League, National Alliance
Popular support: 5percent
Key figures: Bossi, Fini, Alessandra Mussolini
Switzerland
Political parties: Swiss People’s Party
Popular support: 22.5 percent
Key figures: Blocher
Germany
Political parties: German People’s Union, National Democrats, The Republicans
Popular support: 3 percent
Austria
Political parties: Freedom Party
Popular support: 20 percent
Key figures: Haider, Riess-Passer
UK
Political parties: BNP
Popular support: 1-2 percent[ix]
The first thing to say is that there is generally quite a lot of  agreement  about  what  constitutes
the  ‘European  far  right’.  That  said,  the  Guardian  included  two  countries  that  the   BBC
ignored (Portugal and Greece) and the same was true vice-versa (Spain,  Sweden).  It  is
also  interesting  that  both  surveys  neglected  to  mention  the  far-right  movements   of
Eastern Europe. This would seem to be an error because the  majority  of  ex-communist
states in Eastern Europe have witnessed  the  growth  of  far-right  political  activity  since
1989. The movements that have emerged have been very different from their equivalents
in Western  Europe.  Invariably,  they  have  been  shaped  by  the  pre-1989  communist
experience, and have turned out to be loud,  aggressive  and  ultra-nationalist  in  political
persuasion. As Luciano Cheles, Ronnie Ferguson and Michalina Vaughan  have  written:
‘The far right is no longer an exclusively Western European phenomenon; its presence in
Central and Eastern Europe is by now a fact.’[x]
Furthermore, the issue of influence is a curious one. Does one measure the impact  of
a far-right movement by its electoral success? Or by its presence ‘on the ground’? Or  via
some other criteria? Here, Sweden is an interesting case. The  BBC  survey  says  ‘none,
none, none’ for ‘political parties, popular support, key figures’, but it goes on to state:
Sweden has no organised far-right parties, but in recent years the country has seen a wave of neo-
Nazi  violence  -  including  murders  and  bombings  which  have  targeted  immigrants.   Many
Swedes have found it difficult to come to terms with the existence of racist violence in a country
which prides itself on its egalitarian social democracy. Some  suspects  have  been  arrested  and
charged, but there remains an organised underground of white supremacist  youth  who  conduct
such attacks, as well as posting violent neo-Nazi material  on  the  internet,  and  communicating
with similar organisations in the US and Britain. Immigrants account  for  about  one  million  of
Sweden’s population of nearly 10 million, but the number is growing.[xi]
Here  we  learn  that  far-right  activity  isn’t  always  ‘official’  or  ‘engaged  with  the   political
process’. It can be visible, but more often than not it is ‘clandestine’ or  ‘underground’,  as
the report on Sweden notes.
     All this goes to show that neither political scientists nor commentators or journalists can  agree
on the defining characteristics of the  far  right  –  which  doesn’t  bode  particularly  well  for  our
search for definitions and meanings.
Problems of terminology and definition
We must also take account of how those on the far right –  those  who  are  happy  to  be
situated there – perceive themselves in terms of their own  ideological  make-up.  Here  a
suitable starting point is Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the Front National in France. He  is
probably the most famous - and notorious – of modern far-right leaders, and  also,  in  his
writings, a politician who is totally frank and unambiguous about being  ‘of  the  right’.  His
core values are nation, family, religion, and hierarchy. According to Le Pen, these  values
are permanent and unchanging, and are ’concrete’ rather than ’abstract’. As such, the FN
is convinced that its doctrine is fully in tune with a sense  of  ‘nature’  and  ‘tradition’.  The
FN is always proud to proclaim itself as a movement of the right, but at the  same  time  it
sees itself as ’transcending the artificial division between left and right.’[xii] It has no truck
with egalitarian ideas and has put forward various justifications for  natural  selection  and
inequality.[xiii]  Furthermore, Le Pen has ridiculed the ’rights of man’ and has consistently
viewed his values as the antithesis of left-wing principles. In  particular,  he  contrasts  his
brand of nationalism with the ’cosmopolitanism’ and ’internationalism’ of the Socialist and
Communist parties in France. If one attitude has underpinned almost  every  utterance  of
the FN leader since 1972, it  is  hostility  to  the  left;  he  argues  that,  particularly  in  the
French context, it is obsessed with ‘individualism’ and the ’rights of  man’  and  that  as  a
result social institutions like the family and the nation are being undermined.
Maybe at this point we can come  to  an  interim  conclusion  –  that,  when  it  comes  down  to
basics, ‘far right’  equates  to  having  some  relationship  with  inter-war  fascism    (in  terms  of
leadership,  ideology  or  membership,  for  example)  and/or  being  of  the   right   to   an
outlandish or  dangerous  degree.  In  France,  for  example,  Le  Pen  has  trivialised  the
Holocaust by portraying it as a ‘detail’ in the history of the Second World War. Perhaps  it
is no coincidence, therefore, that his party, and others, find themselves sitting on  the  far
right – literally – of parliamentary chambers the length and breadth of Europe. Or  that  in
some countries there have been calls for far-right political movements to be outlawed.
In some cases such calls have been successful and  parties  have  been  banned.  In  Belgium  in
2004 the Vlaams Blok was the subject of a high-court ruling. It  was  considered  to  be  a
‘racist’ political movement and was forced to disband. However, it  reinvented  itself  soon
after as the Vlaams Belang. Episodes like this have led to much  debate  about  ‘strategy’
in the face of the far right. State authorities have invariably argued that the best  policy  is
to  deny  far-right  movements  the  ‘oxygen  of  publicity’  and  to  legislate  them  ‘out   of
existence’ (as was the case in Belgium). However, it occurs to both  friends  and  foes  of
the far right that this may not be the most  astute  and  intelligent  of  tactics.  The  debate
was played  out  in  almost  text-book  fashion  in  Belgium.  One  right-wing  sympathiser
posted this message to an online discussion forum: ‘I am a great admirer  of  the  Vlaams
Blok. While the politically correct thought police in Belgium have attempted to  outlaw  the
largest party in the country - their censorship will  only  serve  to  increase  its  popularity.
The Blok is a group of bright, disciplined, white nationalists who show  a  real  tenacity  to
protect our wonderful shared European culture from the asinine  leftists  who  would  turn
Europe  into  a  multicultural  cesspool.  The  leftists  have   met   their   match.   We   will
triumph.’[xiv]  From  a  different  perspective,  Abou  Jahjah  –  a  political  campaigner  in
Belgium – has argued: ‘The banning of Vlaams Blok only allowed them to start up a  new
party  with  more  clubbable  members...their   persecution   has   not   held   them   back.
Pragmatically, it has helped them.’[xv]
      Throughout,  there  are  complicating  factors  that  cloud  the  issue  and   make   the
challenge of defining the ‘far right’ even more daunting. First, it is clear that  the  term  ‘far
right’, just like its sister term ‘fascist’, has, over the years, become  nothing  more  than  a
term of abuse, pinned on anyone or anything that is offensive, particularly to those on the
left. Let us examine some archetypal left-wing perspectives. In The Socialist in 2006,  the
former editor of Marxism Today, Martin Jacques, commented: ’Not since  the  1930s  has
the threat of racism and fascism been so great in the  West’.[xvi]  Likewise,  in  the  same
year Christian Bunke of the Socialist Party turned the spotlight on the leader of the BNP:
Cambridge graduate and rural landlord Nick  Griffin…said  that  British  workers  had  always
fought against ’the gaffers’. Today, he claimed, this struggle is against the Muslims. In  classic
far-right  fashion,  Griffin  takes  the  vocabulary  of   class   struggle   and   turns   it   into   its
opposite…Nick Griffin told Newsnight that Muslim protests  on  the  Danish  newspaper
cartoons ’will swell the ranks of the BNP’. The  BNP  is  a  parasitic  organisation  that
would support  a  conflict  between  Muslim  and  non-Muslim  workers.  Such  conflict
would not be in the  working  class’s  interests;  the  BNP  is  a  right-wing  anti-worker
organisation. In office on  local  councils,  BNP  councillors  have  failed  abysmally  to
oppose cuts, for example in Burnley. Workers cannot rely on these people to fight  for
their interests. But it would also be foolish to rely on courts to get rid of the BNP.[xvii]
Left-wing commentators are also liable to exaggerate the internal  divisions  and  disputes  evident
within far-right parties.[xviii]
     However, commentators with a more balanced approach – some  even  on  the  left  –
are keen to dispel the idea of  a  ‘resurgent  fascism’.  Lynn  Walsh,  writing  in  Socialism
Today is representative of this trend:
The growth of the far right certainly  poses  a  threat  to  the  working  class.  Racism,  unless
effectively countered, opens up dangerous  divisions  within  the  working  class.  If  Le  Pen
were to come to power in France…he would launch  brutal  attacks  on  the  working
class, just as Berlusconi  is  doing  in  Italy.  But  a  Le  Pen  government,  though  a
serious setback, would not be a totalitarian fascist regime. It would  be  a  right-wing
capitalist government - and  would  provoke  massive  resistance  from  the  working
class and other strata. Despite the neo-fascist antecedents of many  of  the  leaders
of the far-right parties, these formations are not fascist-type  parties  with  their  own
para-military forces…Leaders like Le Pen and Haider have past links with  neo-Nazi
organizations…But they have grown on an electoral level, presenting a  respectable
face, distancing themselves from the tiny neo-fascist groups  on  the  fringes  of  far-
right politics.[xix]
Similarly, Brendan O’Neill, writing on  www.spiked-online.com,  asked:  ‘Is  Europe  really
heading for a new Dark Age, with its Nazi past coming back to haunt it? Are fascistic  far-
right parties really ’on the march again’ everywhere from Greece to France, from  Italy  to
Holland? In a word, no. The current obsession with the rise  of  the  far  right  tells  us  far
more about the European elites’ crisis of confidence and  legitimacy  than  it  does  about
any Nazi reality.’[xx] Perhaps these opinions should be viewed as a necessary corrective
to the slightly  predictable  comments  emanating  from  ‘old-style’  leftists,  who  seem  to
detect the ‘fascist’ threat almost everywhere.
Second, and without too many exceptions, it seems to be  the  case  that  some  individuals  and
movements on the far right do not particularly like being characterised as ‘being of the  far  right’.
If one is not comfortable with, or proud of, the  description,  it  could  be  viewed  as  the  ultimate
insult or  the  ‘kiss  of  death’,  or  even  a  libelous  statement.  This  point  particularly  relates  to
movements  with  serious  political  aspirations  who,  for  all  kinds  of  reasons   (the   desire   for
credibility or access to state funding  perhaps),  would  like  to  be  considered  ‘mainstream’.  The
obvious contradiction here is that  many  movements  generally  considered  to  be  ‘far  right’  are
actually proud of this fact, and make great play of the fact that they do not wish to be  ‘tainted’  by
being bracketed with the ‘other’, ‘traditional’ parties who are invariably portrayed as ‘corrupt’ and
‘old fashioned’.  During  the  1980s  Le  Pen  in  France  crusaded  against  ‘la  Bande  des
Quatres’ – the disparaging nickname he assigned  to  the  ‘ruling  coalition’  of  PS,  PCF,
RPR  and   UDF.   Even   though   these   four   parties   were   totally   independent   and
fundamentally distinct, he came to realise that pigeon-holing them together was  a  useful
tactical device.
Third, what is in and what is out? Do we debate and discuss the public or private  utterances  of
movements we suspect of falling into the ‘far right’ category? And is it  significant  that,  in  some
cases, there is a divergence between  the  two?  Likewise,  are  we  interested  in  the  discourse  of
movements or individuals? Or both? Do we content ourselves with  analysing  the  ‘party  line’  as
articulated by far-right political parties, or can we also build in analysis of individual activists  and
thinkers, who could be slightly out  of  line  with  the  corporate  philosophy  of  their  movement?
Similarly, is there a  sense  in  which  ‘far-right  attitudes’  can  permeate  a  society  rather  than
being, merely, the basis of one party’s political platform? This spectre has certainly  been
raised in Germany, where some analysts fear that ‘extreme’ attitudes are  now  becoming
mainstream. In 2006 De Spiegel announced that:
Far-right views are not just the domain of skinheads and  neo-Nazis  but  are  firmly  anchored
throughout German society, regardless of social class or age, according to a study  of  attitudes
towards foreigners, Jewish people and the Nazi period.  A  new  survey  has  found  that  right-
extremist attitudes are firmly anchored in German society. A study based on a survey of  5,000
people  found  that  9  percent   of   respondents   agreed   with   the   statement   that   a
dictatorship can in certain circumstances be  a  preferable  form  of  government,  and
15.1 percent agreed with this: ‘We should have one  leader  to  rule  Germany  with  a
strong hand for the good of everyone.’ ‘The term “right-wing extremism” is  misleading
because  it  describes  the  problem  as  a  peripheral   phenomenon.   But   right-wing
extremism  is  a   political   problem   at   the   centre   of   society,’   says   the   report
commissioned by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation...[xxi]
Surf the web and you will invariably find other studies in other European countries saying  similar
things.
Fourth,  it  is  clear  that,  in  the  context  of  Europe,  the  far   right   is   neither   uniform   nor
homogenous, but configured slightly differently in each individual country. This  should  come  as
no surprise to us. Each European country has its own unique history and political culture. It is  not
just the strength and popularity of the far right that  differs  from  country  to  country,  but  also  –
perhaps  more  significantly  –  the  nature  of  its  political  discourse.  Different  issues  matter  in
different places. For example, in countries where  immigration  is  a  topical  subject,  it  is  maybe
easier to detect a ‘far right’ party than  in  countries  where  it  isn’t  a  prominent  issue.  Different
countries and continents have differing political cultures, and  what  is  ‘far  right’  in  one  context
may not  be,  or  may  be  different  from,  what  is  ‘far  right’  in  another  context.  Likewise,  the
backdrop can vary: in  Germany  and  Austria  memories  of  the  Nazi  period  is  ever-present;  in
Scandinavia the welfare state is a major bone of contention; while in Eastern Europe the legacy  of
the communist period is all-enveloping.
Fifth, and in a related sense, it is apparent that the European far right – if it is possible to  speak
of such a demarcated phenomenon – has changed and evolved over time.  By  way  of  illustration,
let  us  consider,  for  example,  three  specific  eras:  the  1880s/1890s,  the  1920s/1930s  and  the
1990s/2000s. In France in the 1880s and  1890s  we  see  the  birth  of  a  new  type  of  right-wing
politics, variously described as ‘new’, ‘radical’ or ‘revolutionary’.  This  was  exemplified  by  the
‘right’ forged by  Maurice  Barrès,  General  Boulanger  and  the  League  of  Patriots  –  novel  on
account of its belief in some kind of republicanism or executive government rather  than  royalism
and aristocracy. This  ‘right’  was  ‘right’  in  the  sense  that  it  was  nationalist,  xenophobic  and
sometimes racist, and thus emphasised the inequality of  peoples,  nations  and  races.  It  was
also   authoritarian   and   viewed   the   masses   as   vulnerable   to   manipulation    and
propaganda. Importantly, though, it was a ‘right’ that had no  qualms  about  campaigning
on terrain that was traditionally  ‘working  class’  and  on  integrating  archetypal  left-wing
concerns into its manifesto programme  (for  example,  training,  education  and  workers’
welfare). Its signature policy was the repatriation of immigrant workers – thereby blending
typical right- and left-wing political instincts (in a nutshell: latent xenophobia and  concern
for native French workers). Not surprisingly, therefore, Barrès labelled  his  movement  in
Nancy as ‘national-socialist’ in political orientation – a key marker for the future.
As in so many other spheres, the Great War also had a significant, catalysing effect on
politics and political ideas. By the 1920s and 1930s this ‘right’ had  evolved  into  a  ‘right’
that  was  incontestably  revolutionary.  The  variants  of  fascism  that   existed   in   Italy,
Germany and France, and also across swathes of  Western  and  Eastern  Europe,  were
viewed by opposition groups as both dangerous and threatening. It was posited  that  the
very essence of western civilization was in jeopardy. There was still  an  association  and
alignment with left-wing or socialist values (Mussolini, for example, was an  ex-syndicalist
and the former editor of Avanti, a socialist newspaper), but the revolutionary  right  of  the
inter-war period was interested in more than just winning votes and putting in  place  new
forms of executive government. In Germany, Hitler institutionalised his  extreme  ideology
in the Holocaust and  Lebensraum,  and  sought  a  legacy  in  the  creation  of  a  master
race. By the final years of the  twentieth  century,  the  extreme  right  had,  to  an  extent,
redefined itself. In fact, it had been forced to re-invent itself.  In  the  post-1945  period,  it
was  untenable  to  try  to  maintain  any  kind  of  connection  with   the   Hitler   era.   So,
movements  like  the  MSI  in  Italy  and  FN  in  France  –  and  many  others  across  the
continent – have attempted  to  re-configure  the  political  space  in  which  they  seek  to
operate. Of course, they have found it difficult to smother their hardline, occasionally neo-
Nazi, attitudes, but in some cases they have made a decent fist of this.
Here it is also pertinent to  consider  the  way  in  which  far-right  movements  have  interested
themselves  in  ‘green’  issues.  Until  relatively  recently,  ecology  and   environmentalism   were
regarded as ‘left-wing’ issues.  Green  MPs  and  councillors  habitually  aligned  themselves  with
socialist and communist parties in parliaments and other legislatures ergo ecology  was  viewed
as  an  exclusively  ‘left-wing’  concern.  However,  over  the  last  two  decades,  far-right
activitists have tried to claim the issue for themselves. They have utilised the language of
‘conservation’ and ‘protection’, and linked the idea of the ‘natural world’ to the idea of  the
‘nation’. The FN in France unveiled this new way of thinking in  1990.  Other  movements
have followed suit. The Danish People’s Party puts it like this:
We must take care of the natural world. We will work to ensure that we and future generations
are able to live in a clean and healthy environment. Denmark must develop in unison with  the
natural world, exercising caution when it comes  to  long-term  consequences  of  the  way  we
live. Moreover, we will work both at national and international levels to ensure that the way in
which the earth’s resources are used bears  the  stamp  of  consideration,  care  and  a  sense  of
responsibility, which includes showing care for the natural world and  all  its  living  creatures,
for which we, as stewards of the earth’s riches, are responsible.[xxii]
It is clear that, in the context of far-right discourse, a  link  has  been  made  between  the
environment as an issue and various ‘myths’ of idealised homelands. In the Nazi era,  for
example, Walther Darré established himself as  one  of  Hitler’s  leading  ‘blood  and  soil’
ideologists. He served as  Reich  Minister  of  Food  and  Agriculture  between  1933  and
1942.
Finally, we need to be aware that far-right political movements do not necessarily exist
in neat,  compartmentalised  units.  In  fact,  it  is  usually  taken  as  read  that  traditional
conservative parties across Europe – like  the  Tories  in  Great  Britain  and  the  RPR  in
France – contain  their  own  far-right  ‘fringes’  eg.  radical  and  often  eccentric  political
activists whose ideas and beliefs are slightly out of synch  with  their  leaders’.  The  most
famous example of this phenomenon is Enoch Powell.  Powell  was  a  Conservative  MP
and shadow cabinet minister when, on 20 April  1968,  in  Birmingham,  he  produced  his
‘Rivers of Blood’ speech:
It almost passes belief that at this moment 20 or 30 additional immigrant children are  arriving
from overseas in Wolverhampton alone  every  week  -  and  that  means  15  or  20  additional
families a decade or two hence. Those whom the gods wish to destroy,  they  first  make  mad.
We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of  some  50,000
dependants, who are for the most part  the  material  of  the  future  growth  of  the  immigrant-
descended population. It is  like  watching  a  nation  busily  engaged  in  heaping  up  its  own
funeral pyre. So insane are we that we actually permit unmarried persons to immigrate for  the
purpose of founding a family with spouses and fiancés whom they have never seen…As I look
ahead, I am filled with foreboding; like the Roman, I seem  to  see  ‘the  River  Tiber  foaming
with much blood.’[xxiii]
     In France, in more recent times, Charles Pasqua has become notorious for his hardline attitudes
and policies towards immigrants. In the 1990s Pasqua was a minister in the RPR government. The
RPR was an avowedly conservative movement, but it is argued that Pasqua’s policies had more in
common with the  far  right  and  actually  played  into  their  hands.  According  to  Christian  E.
O’Connell, ‘The Pasqua laws were  enacted  in  1993  at  the  instigation  of  then-Interior
Minister Charles Pasqua, whose vigorous endorsement of “zero immigration” set the tone
for recent French policy in refugee and asylum matters…the  legislation  encompassed  a
broad panoply of severe measures…a toughening of  visa  requirements,  a  reduction  in
the number of visas issued, an expansion of police enforcement powers, an extension  of
the   permitted   detention   period,   and   a   narrowing   of   the   administrative    review
scheme.’[xxiv]
We could also quote the example  of  Nicholas  Sarkozy  who,  as  Interior  Minister  in
2005,   caused   controversy   by   describing   those   responsible   for   the   Paris    riots
as ‘troublemakers’ and ‘a bunch of hoodlums’ – a form of words that was taken  by  many
to have distinctly racial overtones.[xxv] There is no doubt that the far right has  helped  to
make immigration a major political issue. Even Labour prime minister Gordon Brown was
accused by Conservative leader David Cameron of aping  the  language  of  the  far  right
during the Queen’s Speech debate of November 2007.[xxvi]
Main characteristics
So, having aired our misgivings about the term, and debated  its  merits  and  drawbacks,
the question now is  a  simple  one.  Assuming  the  term  does  have  some  value,  what
characteristics are most commonly exhibited by, and associated with, the far right  of  the
political spectrum? It is possible – and perhaps actually quite desirable - to work  towards
some kind of consensus based on the judgement  of  academics  and  the  statements  of
key political players.
Some preliminary points need making straight away. While it  must  be  acknowledged
that the European far right has had a significant impact and  influence  over  the  last  few
decades, and that it has proved both newsworthy and controversial, it would also be  true
to say that it is still only a minority force in political and electoral terms, and also prone  to
splinter and implode organisationally. Nowhere has it been a majority force in  any  sense
of the term. But,  the  far  right  probably  makes  up  for  its  lack  of  ‘formal’  success  by
constantly provoking controversy and media interest.  The  phrase  ‘all  publicity  is  good
publicity’ could have been invented with the parties and politicians of the far right in mind.
One story  goes  that  Le  Pen  in  France  aims  to  involve  himself  in  a  scandal  ‘every
September’ – the start of the French political and  parliamentary  year  -  so  that  he  can
maintain his profile in the media.  Not  surprisingly,  therefore,  the  FN  leader  has  been
embroiled in his fair share of ‘colourful’ controversies –  from  fisticuffs  with  members  of
the general public to allegations of torture during the  Algerian  War.  Furthermore,  in  an
effort to discredit him, his  ex-wife  posed  naked  for  a  pornographic  magazine.  Across
Europe, far-right leaders have displayed a similar ability  to  make  news  for  the  ‘wrong’
reasons, though without obvious comeback: for example, Jörg Haider and  his  ‘pro-Nazi’
views, Zhirinovsky and his demand for a ‘new Russian empire’,  and  Richard  Barnbrook
(leader of the BNP in London), who  was  subject  to  allegations  that  he  produced  and
directed a gay porn film.[xxvii]
It could also be argued that as a political entity the  far  right  is  associated  with  what
could be termed ‘male’ values and perhaps  even  ‘machismo’.  Far-right  movements  do
not particularly sell themselves as such, but there  is  no  doubting  the  fact  that,  on  the
whole, the  ‘image’  of  the  far  right  is  a  ‘masculine’  one.  There  are  also  appeals  to
aggression and violence – exemplified best perhaps by  the  ‘skinhead’  culture  that  has
attached itself to the far right. Moreover, most far-right leaders are male. Across  Europe,
the only real  exceptions  have  been  Susanne  Riess-Passer  of  the  Austrian  Freedom
Party and Pia Kjaersgaard, leader of the Danish People’s  Party.  (We  should  also  note
that Marine Le Pen – daughter of Jean-Marie – is being groomed for the leadership of the
Front National in France when her father stands down,[xxviii] and that two  other  famous
‘daughters’ have hit the headlines: Alessandra Mussolini and Jennifer  Griffin[xxix]).  Note
also that the electorate of the far  right  is  overwhelming  male  and  membership  figures
reveal a male bias.[xxx]
In the popular imagination, the far right is probably best known for its  nationalism  and
racism.  The  names  employed  by  contemporary  far-right   movements   are   the   best
indicators  of  doctrine  and  ideology:  for  example,  Front  National,   National   Alliance,
National Democratic Party, and Danish People’s  Party,  Swiss  People’s  Party,  Hellenic
Front. Beyond the titles, each of  these  movements  is  clear  that  its  primary  reference
point is the nation. The BNP takes a historical perspective on this issue:
The British National Party exists to secure a future for the indigenous peoples of these  islands
in  the  North  Atlantic  which  have  been  our  homeland  for  millennia.  We   use   the   term
indigenous to describe the people whose ancestors were the earliest settlers here  after  the  last
great Ice Age and which have been complemented by the  historic  migrations  from  mainland
Europe. The migrations of the Celts, Anglo-Saxons, Danes, Norse and closely related  kindred
peoples have been, over the past few thousands years, instrumental in  defining  the  character
of our family of nations.[xxxi]
Many far-right movements are prone to simplify their message. The FN have used ‘The French
First’ as one of their banner slogans. Likewise, the  Sweden  Democrats  are  linked  to  the  ‘Keep
Sweden Swedish’ movement.[xxxii] The  corollary  of  this  nation-centredness  is  a  general
hostility to foreigners, immigrants and any manifestation at all of ‘the other’. The  Hellenic
Front has talked about ‘Islamic infiltration in Greece and Europe’ and argues:
The problem of illegal immigration in Greece is not a question of principles or ideology, but  a
policy issue, if we assume that there exists a structured national state. If there  is  a  state,  then
there are borders too. It is known that three are the elements which  define  the  existence  of  a
state: the existence of definite territory, the existence of people living on this territory  and  the
existence of power exercised within the boundaries of the territory and for  the  benefit  of  the
people. And if there exists a state, then the legal distinction between a  native  and  an  alien  is
absolutely  legitimate  and  founded  on  our  Constitution…Say  YES  to  the  immediate
DEPORTATION     of     ALL     ILLEGAL     IMMIGRANTS…Say     NO     to      illegal
immigration.[xxxiii]
Likewise, the Danish People’s Party has stated:
The country is founded on the Danish cultural heritage and therefore, Danish  culture  must  be
preserved and strengthened. This culture consists of the sum  of  the  Danish  people’s  history,
experience,  beliefs,  language  and  customs.  Preservation  and  further  development  of   this
culture is crucial to the country’s survival as  a  free  and  enlightened  society.  Therefore,  we
wish to see action on a broad  front  to  strengthen  the  Danish  national  heritage  everywhere.
Outside Denmark’s borders we would like to  give  financial,  political  and  moral  support  to
Danish minorities. Denmark is not an immigrant-country and has never been so. Therefore, we
will not accept a transformation to a multiethnic society. Denmark belongs  to  the  Danes  and
its citizens must be able to live in a secure community founded on the rule of  law,  developing
only along the lines of Danish culture.[xxxiv]
And according to BBC reports, the People’s  Party  was  able  to  make  immigration  the  primary
issue in the 2005 national elections.[xxxv]
     These passages are highly illuminating. They  are  critiques  of  the  state  in  different
parts of Europe, and point to  its  reluctance,  if  not  outright  failure,  to  place  control  of
national identity at its core. From this stems other points. In the language of the  far  right:
if the  state  is  failing  in  its  duties,  then  nationalist  parties  have  a  legitimate  right  to
organise the defence of their respective nations. And it is then a short step to  policies  of
‘national preference’ and manifestoes and doctrines that are deemed by ordinary  people
and mainstream political parties, to be xenophobic and racist.
      One  step  on  from  xenophobia  and  racism  is  anti-Semitism.   Even   though,   the
‘immigrant question’ has become more topical  in  recent  decades,  far-right  movements
still exhibit, and can’t let go of, a very pointed and unpleasant anti-Semitism. This  is  less
a  doctrine  or  ideology  than  an  instinct  and  impulse  that  manifests  itself  in   certain
situations and contexts, sometimes simply in ‘wordplay’  or  off-the-cuff  comments.[xxxvi]
Also, aside from its racist aspect, anti-Semitism still works on  the  level  of  a  conspiracy
theory, as in the inter-war era. On occasions, too, anti-Semitism breeds  revisionism  –  a
criminal activity whereby the reality of the  Holocaust  is  called  into  question.  We  have
already cited Le Pen’s infamous statement in  1987.  In  more  recent  times,  there  have
been  other  instances  of  revisionism  in  action.  In  January  2005  the  following  report
appeared in the media:
Far-Right German Party Belittles Holocaust
A week before Europe hosts a series of memorial services in honour of the freeing  of
Auschwitz, a group of far-right German politicians caused a stir by  walking  out  on  a
state  ceremony  for  Nazi  victims…In  Germany,  the  historic  moment  when  Soviet
forces  freed  the  infamous  Auschwitz-Birkenau  camp  in  Poland  in  1945   will   be
remembered throughout the country. On Friday, a week  before  the  anniversary,  the
state parliament in Saxony paid tribute to the victims of the Nazis  –  some  six  million
Jews – with a moment of silence. Instead of being a solemn moment of reflection,  the
tribute  turned  into  a  political  bashing  as  12  regional  lawmakers  for  the  far-right
National  Democratic  Party  (NPD)  refused  to  participate  and  stormed  out  of   the
chamber.[xxxvii]
     In this general context, nostalgia has played a key role. Just like the ‘new radical right’ activists
of the 1880s and 1890s and the fascists of the 1920s and 1930s, the far-right militants of the  post-
war era have long memories. Whereas Boulanger and Barrès, under the Third Republic in  France,
reminisced about a strong and patriotic France, and Mussolini and Hitler looked  back  to  ‘golden
age’ periods in the history of their  respective  countries,  the  far-right  agitators  of  today  have  a
variety  of  historical  reference  points.  For  Le   Pen   in   France   it   is   the   glory   of   Algérie
française (the period prior to independence being granted to France’s Algerian  colony  in
1962), while for Zhirinovsky in Russia a world in which Russia’s borders took in the Baltic
states and others. Thus, the notion of empire, and  lost  empire,  is  important  for  the  far
right. And in Austria Haider’s views on the Nazi era have caused great  controversy.  One
of his most infamous utterances came in December 1995 when he declared: ‘The Waffen
SS was a part of the Wehrmacht (German military) and hence it deserves all  the  honour
and respect of the army in public life.’[xxxviii] When Haider entered government,  the  EU
was forced to act. As a mark of protest they inaugurated a period  of  sanctions.  In  time,
the FPÖ was pressured into disassociating itself from Haider’s remarks. Thus, in  2000  a
joint manifesto was issued by the FPÖ and their partners in government, the  centre-right
Austrian People’s Party:
The federal government affirms its unshakeable commitment to the spiritual and moral  values
which are the  shared  heritage  of  the  peoples  of  Europe  and  which  underlie  the  personal
freedom, political freedom and the rule of law upon which all  true  democracy  is  based.  The
government will work for an Austria in which xenophobia, anti-Semitism and racism  have  no
place. It espouses its  own  particular  responsibility  for  respectful  dealings  with  ethnic  and
religious minorities…Austria embraces its responsibility arising from the disastrous history  of
the 20th Century and the  monstrous  crimes  of  the  National  Socialist  regime.  Our  country
shoulders as its  responsibility  the  light  and  dark  aspects  of  its  past  and  the  deeds  of  all
Austrians, good and evil…The uniqueness  and  incomparability  of  the  crime  of  the
Holocaust are a warning to be eternally vigilant  concerning  all  forms  of  dictatorship
and totalitarianism.[xxxix]
Likewise, in Germany the contemporary far  right  is  linked  to  the  Nazi  period.  The  former
leader of the Republikaner Party, Franz Schönhuber, was a Waffen-SS  sergeant,  while  the  NPD
still likes to associate itself with the colours of the German Empire: black, white and red.
For political movements on the fascist right during the inter-war years,  leadership  was  always
an important issue. Leaders, whether they were in government or opposition,  had  a  vital  role  to
play: to inspire, rally and organise. Hence, the ‘cult of personality’ that developed  around  leaders
such as Hitler in Germany, Mussolini in Italy, and Franco in Spain. It was also interesting the way
in which fascist leaders in other countries tried to copy and ape the Central European dictators.  In
France, for example, Jacques Doriot called himself the ‘French Führer’  and  started  to  dress  like
Hitler and also pose and gesticulate like him. In the post-war  years,  far-right  movements  have
placed a similar emphasis on charisma. Le Pen in France has led his party since  1972  –
over 35 years – mainly because potential rivals cannot compete with him as an  orator  or
médiatique personality.
Parties on the extreme right have also emphasised  their  lack  of  faith  in  established
parliamentary and governmental institutions. The BNP is representative: ‘The struggle  to
secure our future is being waged on many fronts. The need for political  power  is  crucial
to bring about our goals. Without effective political representation the majority of  Britons,
who are  deeply  concerned  about  the  future,  have  no  voice  in  the  chambers  where
decisions  are  made.  Increasingly  numbers   of   voters   are   expressing   apathy   and
discontent with the endless incompetence, lies, false promises and  sleaze  coming  from
the three parties that make up the Old Gang. The BNP will contest  and  win  elections  at
council, parliamentary, Assembly or European level in order to achieve political power  to
bring about the changes needed.’[xl] So, as with other far-right parties around Europe the
avowed aim is to work within ‘the system’ in order to  change  it.  At  some  junctures  far-
right  parties  have  also  been  happy  to  endorse  and   encourage   extra-parliamentary
activity, whether riots or demonstrations. Occasionally, these events  have  spiralled  into
violence. In France in March 2006 the FN was implicated in  a  wave  of  political  riots.  A
year previous, Le  Pen  had  claimed  that  direct-action  tactics  had  the  potential  to  be
advantageous and beneficial for  his  movement:  ‘We  are  receiving  thousands  of  new
members, tens of thousands of e-mails. All of our offices are submerged, we  don’t  know
how to respond because we don’t have the staff to reply to the wave  of  people  who,  95
percent of them, salute and approve our positions.’[xli]
It is also clear that far-right movements thrive on, and put great store by,  propaganda.
Of  course,  in  today’s  world  all  political  groupings   want   to   spread   their   message
effectively, ‘spin’ stories to their advantage, and produce converts. But it would be  fair  to
say that the far right puts a  special  emphasis  on  this,  perhaps  because  they  exclude
themselves  (or  feel   excluded)   from   mainstream   political   processes   or   because,
historically, fascist, extreme-right and far-right parties have resorted to propaganda  quite
instinctively and successfully.
     In recent years, far-right political propaganda has taken various forms. On one level it  is  quite
traditional:  hard-hitting  posters  with  a  powerful  political  message,  aimed   especially   at   the
young.[xlii] On another, it is about the different types of  media  that  can  be  employed  to
influence people. Take, for example, the  FN  in  France.  They  have  created  a  cottage
industry out of merchandising their political message and making it accessible to ordinary
people through such things as CDs,  videos,  books,  badges,  stationery,  and  even  key
rings![xliii] There is general agreement, too, on the fact that the FN  was  the  first  French
political party to upload an effective and stylish website.[xliv] Far-right movements across
Europe  have  followed  suit  –  and  some  have  even   provided   an   English-language
version.[xlv] Today, YouTube even hosts BNP songs.[xlvi] Propaganda is also  about  the
nature of the political message  being  conveyed.  The  names  that  far-right  movements
choose for themselves  are  particularly  interesting.  In  Austria:  the  Freedom  Party.  In
Russia: the Liberal Democratic Party. Do  these  monikers  accurately  reflect  the  nature
and character of the movements concerned, or  are  they  are  a  form  of  propaganda  in
themselves?
     The attitude of the far right to the mainstream right is also an interesting issue. The relationship
is normally characterised by mistrust and mutual dislike. However,  on  some  occasions,  far-right
movements have been courted by the mainstream. It has been argued that in Denmark in 2002  the
liberal premier Anders Fogh Rasmussen moved his  party  rightwards  as  part  of  a  strategy.  His
rhetoric changed and became much more alarmist about  the  ‘threat’  posed  by  immigrants.  The
strategy was so successful, it  is  claimed,  that  the  far-right  Danish  People’s  Party  claimed  12
percent of the national vote and thereafter Rasmussen was  able  to  use  the  DPP  as  a
‘parliamentary safety net’.[xlvii] It is also clear that, almost without knowing it, the far right
has the ability to stir, galvanise and sometimes unite  ‘the  opposition’.  In  October  2000,
for instance, the BBC reported that in Belgium,  ‘Opposition  parties  have  vowed  to  co-
operate to prevent the far-right Flemish Bloc from gaining power in Belgian town and  city
halls. The Bloc increased its share of the  poll  in  Antwerp,  Ghent,  Mechelen  and  other
northern Dutch-speaking towns during weekend elections. But politicians from across the
political spectrum said they would boycott the Bloc and form local coalitions  to  keep  the
party out of local government.’[xlviii]
Opponents  of  the  far  right  can  try  to  ‘stereotype’  it  or  ‘exterminate’   it.[xlix]   The
academic response is to try and understand it.  Attempting  to  define  ‘the  far  right’  is  a
troublesome business. We can focus on perceptions and self-perceptions, and then try to
identify the main characteristics of the majority of far-right movements.  But  it  isn’t  easy.
There is something quite nebulous and elusive about the far right. What is ‘far’?  What  is
‘right’? And how do we gauge the nature of political extremities?
Academics across the world are divided on the nature of the  post-war  far  right.  They
cannot assume that everyone is following a single definition  that  simply  does  not  exist.
Indeed, the onus is really on students of the phenomenon to develop their own version of
the ‘story’, their own timeline and lexicon. That said – and we have got  to  try  and  move
towards some kind of  conclusion  -  it  is  clear  that  across  Europe  far-right  parties  do
harbour some common political impulses and instincts.
To recap, almost all movements of the far right are united by a powerful and vehement
anti-communism, although the irony is that many of the most vociferous  ultra-nationalists
(especially in Eastern Europe and the Balkans) are former communists and were actually
brought into being, politically and  ideologically,  by  the  fall  of  the  Berlin  Wall  and  the
collapse of the USSR.
There  is  also  an  interesting  and  important  relationship  with  the   individuals   who
embodied ‘classic fascism’ between the wars. At first, the instinct on the post-war far right
was to ape and mimic, and even to aim for the reconstitution of, the fascist movements of
the 1920s and 1930s. But there was a  gradual  realisation  that  this  would  be  counter-
productive, and so many movements now style themselves as ‘post-Fascist’ and admit to
only a passing, adjacent, contiguous relationship with inter-war fascism, if that. The truth,
of course, is that parties have  had  to  adapt  and  configure  themselves  adroitly  to  the
exigencies of post-war milieus.  And  this  has  had  unpredictable  outcomes,  with  fuzzy
relationships  developing  between  far-right  parties   and   extremist   factions   in   more
mainstream parties, and some boundaries being blurred.
Fundamentally, though, the far right has almost  taken  ownership  of  such  issues  as  national
identity, racism and anti-Semitism, and forms of praxis such as strong  leadership,  direct
action and propaganda.
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